http://www.malaya.com.ph/jul23/busi8.htm
The division of the Supreme Court affirmed administrative and judicial decisions over a land dispute, ignoring a caveat in both.
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago, the ponente of the decision, ruled that the land titles of the heirs of Homer Barques may be reconstituted and thereafter transferred to the claimants of a 34-hectare property owned by the heirs of Severino Manotok.
The Land Registration Authority reversed an earlier decision and declared that the original title of the heirs of Barque may be reconstituted after a competent jurisdiction has cancelled the titles.
The Manotoks appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which also rendered a favorable ruling that was subsequently overturned on a memorandum for reconsideration of the heirs of Barque. The reversed decision which affirmed the ruling of the LRA, had the same caveat.
Justice Santiago wrote: “(Nevertheless, notwithstanding its (Court of Appeals) that petitioner’s (Manotoks) title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that is only the regional trial court which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted.
In short, the order to reconstitute the title of the heirs of Barque is a sole function of the regional trial court as acknowledged by the Supreme Court itself. Strangely, through, the first division of the Supreme Court in ruling against the Manotoks, declared “indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals.”
Usurpation
The LRA, the CA and finally the Supreme usurped the sole jurisdiction of the regional trial court in reconstitution of titles. BP No. 129 provides “regional trial courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction …in all civil actions, which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.”
The Property Registration Decree also provides “a Torrens title (in this case of the Manotoks) cannot be cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.”
I take it to mean that “in accordance with law” directly refers to the necessity of allowing the regional trial court to make a judgment since it has exclusive original jurisdiction.
Justice Santiago does not believe so. She finds it circuitous that the decision of the RTC will be appealed to the Court of Appeals. But didn’t the Manotoks file a motion for reconsideration with the LRA which was denied?
Didn’t the Manotoks similarly file same motion which the Court of Appeals also denied?
Why should it now be circuitous to comply with a law providing that in cases such as this, the regional trial court has exclusive original jurisdiction?
The LRA, the CA and finally the Supreme Court, came to the conclusion that the Manotok title is sham and spurious without the benefit of testimonies, cross-examinations and expert examination of documents which would have been done in a regional trial court as required by law.
It seems that the Supreme Court accepts the necessity of subjecting the case to a regional trial court as suggested by the LRA and the CA but found it worth neglecting and deciding the case in favor of the heirs of Homer Barque.
This is most unusual.
It’s still the law
The Court made the observation in the ponencia of Justice Santiago that “by opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners (the Manotoks) acquiesced to the authority of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title.”
But what about the law saying that the regional trial court has exclusive original jurisdiction? Can that be waived by agreeing to the authority of a reconstituting officer? Maybe, if the matter is an administrative reconstitution. But this one is not, as shown by the fact that the Court of Appeals initially ruled in favor of the Manotoks then reversed its decision in favor of the heirs of Homer Barque. The case is a judicial reconstitution. In fact, the Supreme Court decided it with finality by denying two motions for reconsideration of the Manotoks.
The Court even said there is no basis in the allegation that the petitioners (Manotoks) were deprived of their property without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC.”
But the law provides that the RTC has exclusive and original jurisdiction. To my mind, the Supreme Court should help enforce it. Surprisingly, the Court violated it.
It’s the plan that is spurious!
In granting the petition of the heirs of Homer Barque to have the title transferred to them, the Supreme Court said that the title of the Manotok is spurious. Not exactly if one examines the genuineness or falsity of the plan – Fls-3168 – submitted by the heirs of Homer Barque and sought by the LRA.
Privadi Dalire, chief of the geodetic surveys division of the Land Management Bureau, declared “our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our microfilm computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168, logically we cannot issue any copy.”
But a copy surfaced from somewhere, just the same. The flaw is in the findings that “the certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and the signing official are separate. Ours is one piece.
“We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy. The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp “Not for Registration/ Titling for Reference only” is smaller than our stamp.
“The copy bears forged initials of my section (Dalire’s geodetic survey division) officer and myself. I sign completely (in full) certification.
“The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master copy.”
Which document is spurious? The title of the Manotoks or the plan of the heirs of Homer Barque. The Manotoks, according to the Supreme Court.
Verification is necessary
The majority opinion makes so much capital of the fact that the Land Registration Authority allegedly exceeded its authority when it demanded the production of the plan of the claimants, the heirs of Homer Barque. The ponente, Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago, ruled that “the LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the construction.
The basis for this opinion is a section of R.A. 26 which states “transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from … the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title.
The majority decision relies heavily on the claim that the plan FLS 3168-D “is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands.”
Ignored by the majority opinion is the fact that there are testimonies that the plan is a forgery and therefore does not exist. The Bureau of Lands itself so certified that the plan is spurious, a forgery.
Why should the Court now blame the LRA for exceeding its jurisdiction by proving that the plan is spurious although the Court does not believe it is?
The lesson here is if the law that gives original exclusive jurisdiction to the regional trial court had been complied with, the truth or falsity of the existence of the plan would have been established. Then the Supreme Court would have been denied the claim that the LRA exceeded its jurisdiction. On the contrary, it might be said that the LRA helped in ferreting out the truth.
Thus, the submission of the plan which turned out to be a forgery could have helped the Court except that it was ignored as exceeding authority.
Verification is necessary
While a circular of the LRA states “only the owner’s or co-owners duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution,” there is another provision in the same circular that does not hold this as the be-all of administrative reconstitution.
A paragraph of the Circular states that “if the reconstituting officer or the Register of Deeds of another registry, after appropriate verification, is convinced that the certificate of title may be reconstituted, he shall issue an order of reconstitution. Otherwise, he shall deny the petition, stating his reasons therefore.”
It is clear here that a verification is a requirement, not just the submission of the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title for reconstitution.
I personally find no abuse of authority when a man complies with the law in search of the truth. The majority decision finds very little use for that search. On the contrary, the decision derides the reconstituting officer by saying he should confine himself to the duplicate of the original title.
What this clearly suggests is that the reconstituting officer should take as gospel truth the duplicate of the original title which was burned. How else does one prove the authenticity of the duplicate of the burned original except by verification?
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